Since the beginning of July, DeFi lending volume has increased by more than 55%, reaching around $56 billion, following a difficult second quarter when $11.33 billion left the sector.
Q2 outflow and the Kelp DAO effect
In the spring, the sector faced cascading risks: in April, attackers used the Kelp DAO cross-chain route to create 116,500 unsecured rsETH (about $290 million at the time), with a significant portion of these tokens used as collateral for borrowing on Aave markets. Although Aave’s smart contracts were not breached, deposits in the protocol dropped by roughly $15 billion within a few days, and the rsETH and wrsETH markets were frozen. By the end of the quarter, lending had declined by 16.78%.
Aave reassesses risks and winds down six networks
Aave Labs CEO Stani Kulechov notes that accepting a token as collateral means taking on the risks of its bridges, oracles, and issuer infrastructure: “Security does not end with the smart contract.” According to him, every asset on Aave is now reviewed quarterly and again after any significant changes. The protocol has begun an “orderly wind-down” on six networks that do not meet chain-level standards.
Spark exited rsETH early; providers on risk controls
Spark CEO Sam MacPherson says that beyond smart contracts, the team assesses governance design, operational security, collateral quality, liquidity management, and ecosystem dependencies. Spark began phasing out rsETH back in January due to low usage and yield relative to the added risk. Maple co-founder and CEO Sid Powell believes that “serious lenders” should assume the possibility of borrower default and plan for collateral access: “What do I hold, where is it, can I see it in real time, and how quickly can I access it?” Ledn CFO Thomas Wu adds that each wrapper, bridge, and oracle is another potential point of failure.
Rising TVL increases appeal for AI-assisted attacks
The increase in locked liquidity volume makes the sector a more visible target. With protocol interconnectivity and the emergence of AI-assisted attacks, Kulechov emphasizes that no protocol controls the entire ecosystem, but can limit the risk it accepts and its response speed. MacPherson adds that loss prevention is only part of the task; protocols should have established incident response procedures.
